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 CONTEXT AND COMPLIANCE: A 
COMPARISON OF STATE SUPREME 
COURTS AND THE CIRCUITS 
SARA C. BENESH* 
WENDY L. MARTINEK** 
A host of scholars have argued that decision making in lower courts is at 
least partially determined by decision making in the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
other words, Supreme Court jurisprudence in a given area influences the way 
that the lower courts decide similar cases.
1
  This may seem like an 
 
* University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, sbenesh@uwm.edu. 
** Binghamton University & National Science Foundation, wemartin@nsf.gov.  This Article is 
based on a paper originally presented at the Marquette University Law School Criminal Appeals 
Conference held June 15–16, 2009.  We are indebted to Harold J. Spaeth for his insights on this and 
related work.  This manuscript reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 
views of the National Science Foundation.  Wendy Martinek does, however, gratefully acknowledge 
the support of the National Science Foundation for the conduct of this research.  
1. The literature regarding compliance on the part of inferior courts with superior courts is 
voluminous.  It is, in fact, too voluminous to catalogue here. Representative examples of this 
literature include: SARA C. BENESH, THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE (2002); BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. 
JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999); FRANK B. CROSS, 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY 
MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); G. ALAN TARR, 
JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS (1977); Lawrence Baum, Implementation of 
Judicial Decisions: An Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86 (1976); Lawrence Baum, Lower 
Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 
(1978); Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals Policies: An 
Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States 
Supreme Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260 
(1972); Edward N. Beiser, A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The 
Reapportionment Cases, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 788 (1968); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, 
Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of 
Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002); James Brent, A Principal-Agent Analysis of U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Responses to Boerne v. Flores, 31 AM. POL. RES. 557 (2003); James C. Brent, An Agent and Two 
Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236 (1999); Evan H. 
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 
(1994); Bradley C. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil 
Liberties Decision, 8 L. & SOC. REV. 109 (1973); Bradley C. Canon & Kenneth Kolson, Rural 
Compliance with Gault:  Kentucky, a Case Study, 10 J. FAM. L. 300 (1971); Pamela C. Corley, 
Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions , 37 AM. POL. 
RES. 30 (2009); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Tracey E. 
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unremarkable assertion given the principle of stare decisis and the expectation 
that lower courts are bound by decisions made by higher courts.
2
  
Nonetheless, there are intriguing evidentiary omissions with regard to what 
we know about compliance with Supreme Court precedent.  In particular, 
despite the voluminous expenditures of scholarly time and attention, we do 
not know how the High Court’s influence on the federal circuit courts 
compares with its influence on the state courts of last resort.
3
 
We might well assume that the Supreme Court has far greater impact on 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals since those courts are more closely constrained to 
follow Supreme Court precedent by virtue of their position in the federal 
judicial system.  In contrast, state courts of last resort are not direct members 
of the federal judicial system and are therefore more divorced from Supreme 
Court influence.  Further, while we know that the Supreme Court hears very 
few cases from the federal courts of appeals, it hears an even smaller 
percentage of cases most recently decided by the state supreme courts.
4
  It 
 
George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals 
En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001); John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of 
Libel: Compliance by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502 (1980); Charles A. Johnson, Lower 
Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: A Quantitative Examination , 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 792 
(1979); Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision-making: Lower Federal Court Uses 
of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 L. & SOC. REV. 325 (1987); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a 
Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1605 (1995); Jennifer K. Luse et al., ―Such Inferior Courts . . . ‖: Compliance by Circuits with 
Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75 (2009); Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and 
the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 669 (2008); Traciel V. Reid, 
Judicial Policy-Making and Implementation: An Empirical Examination, 41 W. POL. Q. 509 (1988); 
Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in Economic Policy Making in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J.  POL. 830 (1987); Donald R. Songer et al., Do Judges Follow 
the Law when There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137 (2003); Donald R. Songer et al., 
The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court 
Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme 
Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990).  
2. As the Supreme Court has asserted, stare decisis ―is a basic self-governing principle within 
the Judicial Branch.‖  Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
3. Most states have reserved the term ―supreme court‖ for their highest courts and, accordingly, 
here we use that term interchangeably with ―state court of last resort‖ and ―state high court.‖  We 
recognize, however, that there are notable exceptions (e.g., the state of New York, which uses 
―supreme court‖ to refer to its major trial courts and ―court of appeals‖ as the appellation for its 
highest court). 
4. During the 2007 term, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court took some action on 244 cases 
appealed from the federal courts, while it took action on only 22 from the state courts.  By action, we 
include full opinions and memorandum orders.  Looking only to full opinions, the difference is even 
more stark:  The Court reversed twenty-six cases from the circuit or district courts, vacated eleven, 
and affirmed twenty, for a total of fifty-seven cases fully considered. In comparison, it reversed a 
paltry six from the states, vacated a mere three, and affirmed only an additional three for a total of 
twelve cases fully considered. See The Supreme Court 2007 Term—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 516, 525 tbl.II(E) (2008). 
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seems, therefore, that the motivation to abide by Supreme Court rulings is 
dramatically reduced in the state courts and, accordingly, that a reasonable 
expectation is that Supreme Court precedent will fare worse in structuring 
decision making on state courts in comparison to decisions on the federal 
circuit courts.
5
 
Contrary to these expectations, however, Martinek found that state court 
decisions actually do comport closely with Supreme Court policy in the area 
of search and seizure.
6
  In fact, Martinek found that the state supreme courts 
decide their cases in greater accord with High Court prescriptions than do the 
federal circuit courts.
7
  Benesh and Martinek’s findings are also suggestive in 
the area of confession, the area of law we consider in this Article.
8
  They 
found that state high courts are influenced by Supreme Court policy, even 
after controlling for the influence state elites (who are instrumental in staffing 
the bench) have on these courts.
9
  They characterize this influence as a legal 
one, rather than one driven by a fear of reversal, because only those facts the 
Court deemed relevant to the decision whether to admit a given confession 
were significant, while the ideological predisposition of the Supreme Court, 
which a lower court looking to avoid reversal would consider, was not.
10
  
Motivated by these somewhat counterintuitive findings, we suggest an 
additional comparative analysis of Supreme Court impact on state and lower 
federal courts. 
Here, we undertake a systematic comparison of decision making in state 
supreme courts and the U.S. courts of appeals in the area of criminal 
confessions.  Prior work has demonstrated that the Supreme Court does 
indeed influence the federal courts of appeals in this area of law.
11
  We 
provide additional evidence that all lower courts are constrained and that the 
 
5. Though the U.S. circuit courts were abolished in 1912, the term ―circuit court‖ remains in 
colloquial use to refer to the U.S. courts of appeals, which were created by the Judiciary Act of 1891.  
See ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (repealed 1912); Judicial Code of 1912, ch. 13, § 289, 36 Stat. 1167 
(1911). We use ―U.S. courts of appeals,‖ ―courts of appeals,‖ and ―circuit courts‖ interchangeably 
herein. 
6. Wendy L. Martinek, Judicial Impact: The Relationship Between the United States Supreme 
Court and State Courts of Last Resort in Search and Seizure Decision-Making 88 (2000) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (on file with authors).  See also Valerie 
Hoekstra, Competing Constraints: State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions and 
Legislation on Wages and Hours, 58 POL. RES. Q. 317, 320 (2005), for an analysis of the influence of 
Supreme Court decisions regarding minimum wage law on state supreme court behavior.  
7. Martinek, supra note 6, at 89.  
8. Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, State Supreme Court Decision-Making in Confession 
Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109, 110, 125 (2002). 
9. Id. at 125. 
10. Id.; see also David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of 
Lower Court Compliance, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 579, 579, 582 (2003). 
11. BENESH, supra note 1. 
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influence of the Supreme Court is seen throughout the lower courts, be they 
state or federal courts, and without regard to the fact that the High Court 
appears to do little to induce that compliance. 
Further, an increasing number of decisions emanating from both state and 
federal lower courts are final.  If one type of court—state high court or federal 
intermediate appellate court—more closely adheres to Supreme Court 
precedent than another, there are important ramifications for due process. 
Certainly, it is unremarkable to note that there are regional differences across 
the country—the federal nature of American government is both a product of 
and a reflection of this fact.
12
  And it is also unremarkable to observe that 
these differences most likely manifest themselves in the policy making of 
various branches and levels of government.  But the Supreme Court is 
charged with interpreting the Constitution for the entire nation, and its 
interpretation of the rights afforded to the accused in terms of representation 
and self-incrimination, which the Court has confirmed are constitutionally 
based,
13
 must be effectuated in all criminal systems, not just in the one for 
which it is naturally the apex (i.e., the federal system).  If Supreme Court 
decisions did not matter to the state supreme courts, there would be myriad 
cases decided in the legal systems of this country every day that may be 
inconsistent with (or perhaps downright abhorrent to) Supreme Court policy.  
Because the High Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution, surely we 
expect some attention to be paid to it by the state courts.  Just how much 
attention, and how that attention compares with the attention paid by the U.S. 
courts of appeals, is the question of interest in this Article. 
I.  THE INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
To understand the relationship between higher and lower courts, scholars 
have frequently utilized one of two theories: principal–agent theory14 or team 
theory.
15
  For our purposes here, the distinction matters little.  Each theoretical 
perspective assumes that Supreme Court precedent matters.  While some 
 
12. The geographic organization of the courts of appeals suggests a sensitivity to regional 
influence as well.  See RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL 
COURTS 21 (1970).  Further, though these courts are charged with interpreting and applying the same 
federal law, ―[t]he task to which the courts of appeals have called themselves is that of making the 
national law as applied to their geographical territories.‖  Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of 
the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe Pound’s Structural Solution , 15 J.L. & POL. 515, 517 
(1999). 
13. See Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). 
14. See, e.g., Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice, supra note 1. 
15. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 1612–13; Chad Westerland et al., Lower Court 
Defiance of (Compliance with) the U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 9, 2006) (unpublished paper, presented 
at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=929018. 
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scholars argue that the Supreme Court, as an institution, really has very little 
impact and cannot single-handedly change the direction of any given policy,
16
 
the extant evidence demonstrates that the lower courts do pay at least some 
heed to the Supreme Court.  Whether we say that a lower court does so 
because it is acting as an ―agent‖ of its ―principal‖ or because it is acting as a 
―member‖ of a ―team‖ is immaterial for our purposes here.  What matters is 
that the Supreme Court is posited, in each theory, to have some influence over 
decisions by the lower courts. 
Baum offers yet another way to understand the role the Supreme Court’s 
precedent may play in lower court decision making.  In particular, Baum 
urges scholars to take into account the effect of audiences on judicial 
behavior.
17
  While he considers personal audiences to be most influential, he 
also discusses the effect that other (more instrumental) audiences have on 
judicial behavior, including those responsible for a judge’s tenure and a 
judge’s colleagues on the bench.18  Indeed, in discussing the idea of intra-
court influences, Baum suggests that the desire to be perceived as a good 
judge may influence that jurist to, for example, hew more closely to 
precedent.  The logic is that the quality of legal interpretation, arguably 
enhanced by citation of Supreme Court precedent, will determine whether 
judges’ colleagues will see them as good judges.19  Principal–agent theory 
discusses this idea as one of ―standard operating procedures,‖ whereby agents 
influence one another to behave in certain ways—here, to faithfully 
implement precedent.
20
  In team theory, the discussion focuses on judges 
attempting to arrive at the ―correct‖ decision, which is most cheaply obtained 
by complying with vertical precedent as handed down by a resource-rich 
group of experts that are on the team—namely, the Supreme Court.21 
Regardless of the motivation, we expect lower courts to consider and 
apply Supreme Court precedent, but we also expect context to matter.  There 
 
16. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008). 
17. LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR, at xi (2006). 
18. Id. at 113.  See also Cross & Tiller, supra note 1, at 2159.  As a point of contrast, see 
Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123 (2004). 
19. BAUM, supra note 17, at 54, 113. 
20. See JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE: 
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 50 (1997).  
21. See Westerland et al., supra note 15, at 2–4.  In economic terms, the efficiency of following 
precedent to arrive at the ―right‖ outcome is enhanced when that precedent has been ―solidified in a 
long line of decisions . . . .  The rule then represents the accumulated experience of many judges 
responding to the arguments and evidence of many lawyers . . . .‖  William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250 (1976). 
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are, as noted earlier, several reasons why one might expect a higher level of 
compliance from the U.S. courts of appeals than from the state courts of last 
resort.  The first is the technical distinction over High Court jurisdiction and 
the fact that the state supreme courts are not a direct part of the federal court 
system.  More specifically, it is only when what is at issue is a question of 
federal law or federal constitutional interpretation that the U.S. Supreme 
Court is formally the final arbiter and state supreme courts are considered 
bound by the applicable rulings of the nation’s highest court. 
The Supreme Court (via Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) made a strong 
statement to this effect in its decision in Michigan v. Long: 
 
It is precisely because of this respect for state courts, and this 
desire to avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to 
continue to decide issues of state law that go beyond the 
opinion that we review, or to require state courts to 
reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions. 
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision 
fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be 
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and 
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear 
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most 
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case 
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it 
to do so.
22
 
 
Obviously then, state supreme court judges can avoid Supreme Court 
precedent by basing their rulings on their own state constitutions or the 
precedent of their own courts, something that is unavailable to court of 
appeals jurists.  In addition, the latter are supposed to have a greater level of 
professionalism due to their inclusion in the federal judiciary and, 
accordingly, might be expected to consider more carefully the rulings of their 
constitutionally proscribed superior.
23
  The state supreme courts, however, 
may be inclined to separate themselves from the federal system, thereby 
strengthening their position as major players in their respective state 
governments.
24
 
 
22. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983). 
23. Canon, supra note 1; Gruhl, supra note 1; see Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on 
Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1017, 1022 (1959). 
24. Indeed, Haas’s comparative study of U.S. court of appeals and state supreme court 
treatment of Supreme Court rulings in the area of prisoners’ rights found greater congruence between 
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals in decision direction than between state supreme courts 
and the High Court.  Kenneth C. Haas, The ―New Federalism‖ and Prisoners’ Rights: State Supreme 
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Perhaps more than the relative position of the U.S. courts of appeals in the 
American judicial hierarchy, the milieu within which state supreme courts 
operate provides ample reason to expect less faithfulness on the part of the 
state supreme courts than is manifested in the lower federal courts.  Simply 
put, while a focus on the vertical relationship between the Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts makes sense in light of the fact that they are operating 
within a single legal code and as part of a unified judicial system, such a 
singular focus in studying state supreme courts is untenable given the array of 
local forces with which state supreme courts must contend.  State supreme 
courts are not only part of the American judicial system, they are constituent 
parts of individual state political systems as well.  In other words, ―[U]nlike 
judges in lower federal courts, state supreme courts are also embedded in state 
political environments that include other actors with the ability to influence 
their decisions.‖25  We might then expect that the state courts ignore (or 
evade) Supreme Court policy (when they disagree with it or when their 
agreement is insufficient) more often than the federal circuit courts.  State 
courts simply have more important things with which to deal.  They have 
other audiences to consider; they have multiple principals to satisfy; they are 
not an explicit part of the team.  Even agreement with the Supreme Court’s 
policy prescriptions may not be sufficient to compel these courts to comply, 
given that they must also consider other actors’ reactions to their compliance. 
If we consider Baum’s idea of audiences,26 it becomes clear that the state 
supreme court judges are in a far more delicate situation.  To be sure, they 
have a judicial audience and likely care what the federal courts think of their 
decisions in matters concerning federal law.  However, they also have more 
direct audiences to consider: the voters or legislators (depending on the 
system of judicial retention) who determine whether they retain their position, 
and members of the state bar (who likely reflect the ideology of state elites) 
who will digest, utilize, and evaluate their decisions.  In short, audiences for 
members of state supreme courts are varied, and ties to the federal judiciary 
may well seem remote by comparison.  In the parlance of principal–agent 
theory, there are ―multiple principals‖ to whom state high court judges are 
beholden, including the U.S. Supreme Court in matters of federal law, but also 
those responsible for the continued tenure of the judges of the court, including 
the public when the judges are elected and state elites when the judges are 
appointed.  Their faithfulness to one set of principals may spell unfaithfulness 
to others.  In terms of team theory, judges on state high courts simply may not 
 
Courts in Comparative Perspective, 34 W. POL. Q. 552, 560–69 (1981). 
25. Scott A. Comparato & Scott D. McClurg, A Neo-Institutional Explanation of State Supreme 
Court Responses in Search and Seizure Cases, 35 AM. POL. RES. 726, 729 (2007). 
26. BAUM, supra note 17. 
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see themselves as members of the federal judiciary, and thus their attempts at 
maximizing their organizational effectiveness may not include consideration 
of what federal courts are doing, but rather focus on how best to organize their 
own court systems. 
II.  THE CONFESSION CASES 
These ideas about the differential strength of Supreme Court precedent in 
models of decision making in the states versus decision making in the circuits 
are tested in this Article via the use of two existing datasets that code cases 
involving confessions.  These cases fit the type of analysis to be employed 
here for several reasons.  First, they are controversial cases involving the 
rights of the criminally accused, arguably a type of case that draws attention 
from several different sectors.  Second, in this area of law, the Supreme Court 
itself has indicated that differences of fact should matter to the resolution of 
the case; hence, measuring Supreme Court precedent is more easily 
accomplished by coding for factual circumstances the Court has deemed 
relevant to the admission of a confession (e.g., whether Miranda rights were 
read, whether the accused was brought promptly before a magistrate, whether 
the accused was young, etc.).
27
  In choosing this area of law, then, we are able 
to determine whether the facts indicated by the High Court as important 
factors in the determination of the voluntariness of a confession are the same 
facts considered by lower courts.  In addition, this area of the law is useful for 
this type of analysis because there were changes over time in Supreme Court 
doctrine.  Presuming that lower courts are attentive to the Supreme Court, 
they should move in a liberal direction (toward Miranda’s protective stance), 
as the Supreme Court did, and then in a conservative direction (away from 
Miranda) as the Court has done in creating numerous exceptions to Miranda’s 
proscriptions.  This allows for a test of responsiveness as well as 
congruence.
28
  Third, this set of cases is relevant to the states as well as to the 
federal courts, because both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the 
Constitution are binding on state governments as well as the federal 
government.
29
  And finally, though our dataset does not extend to the present, 
 
27. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1963). 
28. Responsiveness implies that as the Supreme Court modifies its doctrine, so, too, the lower 
court modifies its doctrine in the same direction.  Congruence, on the other hand, implies that a lower 
court and the Supreme Court, given the same facts, would decide the case in the same way. 
Congruence is time-dependent and specific to a given decision, while responsiveness is more a 
measure of trends and the propensity of the lower court to follow the Supreme Court ideologically.  
The former leaves minimal room for the lower court to exercise discretion (e.g., act in accordance 
with attitudinal predilections), while the latter does afford some leeway.  
29. The right to counsel was incorporated fully in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 
(1963), and the protection against self-incrimination was incorporated in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1, 8 (1964). 
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this is surely an area of criminal law with which the state and the federal 
courts continue to contend, as evidenced most starkly by the Supreme Court’s 
recent ruling in Corley v. United States.
30
 
To measure precedent by identifying relevant case facts in confession 
cases, we draw on Benesh,
31
 who applied a fact pattern model of confession 
cases to the U.S. courts of appeals, demonstrating the federal intermediate 
appellate courts’ attention to the Supreme Court in this area of the law.  In the 
next Part, we briefly recap what Benesh found and then discuss the 
application of her work to studying the state supreme courts, discussing as 
well the operationalization of the additional influences on the state court 
discussed above as competing with the Supreme Court’s precedent for 
influence.  We then explicitly compare decision making in confession cases in 
each court.  We conclude with a discussion of what this means for the impact 
of the Supreme Court in this particular area of criminal law and for the state 
of criminal law itself. 
III.  SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN CONFESSION CASES 
Benesh tested a model of confession cases in the U.S. courts of appeals 
and in so doing created a usable set of facts with a prima facie claim to being 
related to Supreme Court decision making in the confession cases.
32
  These 
factors fall into three categories: coercion, characteristics of the accused, and 
procedural considerations.
33
  We discuss each in turn and derive our measure 
of precedent from this categorization. 
First, actual coercion is expected to be an important fact in the 
determination of voluntariness.  Where coercion is present, manifested either 
physically or psychologically, courts will more likely suppress the confession.  
Where it is not, courts will be less likely to do so.  Forms of coercion, other 
than those explicitly physical or psychological, also exist and are coded.  
These include deprivation of basic needs (including lack of food or sleep), 
length and place of detention, incommunicado detention, whether the 
 
30. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).  This case concerned the timely presentment of an accused before a 
magistrate, as required by McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943), and Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957).  The Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that an accused must be brought 
before a magistrate within six hours of arrest, unless police have an adequate reason for a delay, and 
that if he or she is not, any confession obtained before presentment must be excluded from evidence 
at trial.  129 S. Ct. at 1571.  It is also an area of law that consistently attracts the attention of legal 
reformers and non-governmental organizations.  See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., 
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
(2009); AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004). 
31. BENESH, supra note 1. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 61–62. 
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defendant is represented by counsel, and whether the defendant requested an 
attorney but was denied by his interrogators.  Mitigating factors would serve 
to counter any existing coercion. 
In addition to these coercive factors, Benesh discusses several 
characteristics of the accused that may lead an individual to be more or less 
affected by (overtly or subtly) coercive methods.  These include mental status, 
intelligence, race, experience, youth, legal experience, and some other 
miscellaneous characteristics.
34
  Other miscellaneous characteristics include, 
for example, situations in which the detainee is a mother of several small 
children, a drug addict, someone with high blood pressure, ill or under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, or very slight of build. 
Finally, there are several procedural defects that might taint the 
voluntariness of a confession.  These include failure to read the Miranda 
rights, a lengthy interrogation, a coercive environment for that interrogation, 
the use of police relay tactics in questioning, courtroom procedural unfairness 
(including, for example, whether the court heard testimony as to voluntariness 
outside the presence of the jury), the determination that a given error was 
harmless, a confession that was the fruit of some prior illegality (an illegal 
arrest or an illegal search found to have induced the confession), and the 
failure to bring the defendant before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.  
Of course, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights would also 
affect the determination of voluntariness. 
We measure the influence of these various factors by considering them to 
be facts to be balanced by the lower courts in the three above-discussed 
categories.  Hence, the lower court will determine whether, considering those 
aspects that weigh against admitting a challenged confession against those 
that weigh in favor of admitting a challenged confession, the confession in 
question was coerced, the defendant’s will was overborne, or the arrest and 
trial were conducted in accordance with fair procedures.  In other words, we 
expect the lower courts to consider all factors relevant to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions over time as a sort of running tally of those factors favorable to an 
accused’s challenge of the admission of his confession and those that run 
against it.  So, for example, if the accused was not read her rights and was 
young, but she did volunteer some statements, the lower court will be less 
likely to exclude her confession than if she did not volunteer the statements.  
Likewise, the claims of an accused who was taken before a magistrate and 
read his rights will be treated differently from those of an accused who was 
 
34. These characteristics (and others) are posited to affect the level of coercion likely to have 
been present during the interrogation.  All affect the will of the accused to overcome such coercion.  
Id.  For an informative discussion of the psychological mechanisms leading to these effects, see Saul 
M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 193, 203–06 (2008). 
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only read his rights. 
Accordingly, we create three variables to measure the weight of precedent 
in each case: one to take into account the balance of coercion (the number of 
factors that showed coercion less the number that showed a lack of coercion), 
one to measure the characteristics of the accused (the number of factors that 
would indicate vulnerability less the number that would indicate the ability to 
withstand pressure), and one to measure the procedures employed in the case 
(the number of factors that indicate problematic procedures less the number of 
procedural safeguards at issue in the case).  All three of these variables are 
coded such that positive values are expected to enhance the likelihood that a 
confession will be excluded, and negative values are expected to decrease that 
likelihood (that is, are expected to increase the likelihood that a confession 
will be admitted). 
In addition to these three key variables, we also measure change in 
precedent within the time frame under investigation.  Both principal–agent 
and team theory accounts would suggest that a lower court heeds a change in 
policy and pays attention to the current policy preferences of the Supreme 
Court in making its decisions.  A concern with audience would also suggest 
that a lower court judge should take note of changing circumstances with 
respect to Supreme Court preferences.  Hence, as the Supreme Court becomes 
more conservative, we would expect the lower courts to be more likely to 
admit a challenged confession, especially as the Court makes exceptions to 
the central holding of Miranda. 
During the time frame under investigation in this Article, the Court 
decided that it was acceptable to use un-Mirandized statements to impeach 
testimony should the accused decide to testify, even though such statements 
could not be introduced as evidence of guilt.
35
  The Court also determined that 
evidence obtained from witnesses brought to light via an unwarned statement 
was still admissible, even though the police would not have known of the 
witness but for the accused’s statement (which was not preceded by the 
Miranda warnings).
36
  The Court also permitted the admission of statements 
taken from an accused who had earlier invoked his right to silence because 
both interrogations were preceded by Miranda warnings and were separated 
by a substantial time lapse.
37
  All of these cases would lead an attentive lower 
court to believe that the Court was moving away from a strict adherence to 
Miranda, and so may have affected the propensity of the lower courts to 
 
35. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971). 
36. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 435, 451–52 (1974). 
37. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–06, 107 (1975).  The Court further retreated from 
Miranda subsequently, but as our analysis ends at 1981, no other exceptions are relevant to this 
analysis. 
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exclude confessions.  Accordingly, we include a variable that increases as the 
Court makes accommodations for the use of uncounseled statements.  It starts 
at 0, increases to 1 in 1971, to 2 in 1974, and to 3 in 1975.  We expect this 
variable to be negatively signed; that is, as the Supreme Court moves away 
from Miranda, confessions will be less likely to be excluded by lower courts. 
We also include a measure of Supreme Court ideology to account for the 
possibility that the lower courts use Court ideology as either a proxy for the 
direction of the law, giving the lower court the ability to anticipate these 
shifts, or as an indicator of the likelihood that a given decision will be 
reversed, which we assume judges avoid when possible.  We measure this 
variable as the mean Segal and Cover score for the Supreme Court in the year 
of the lower court’s decision.38 
IV.  SELECTING CASES 
To compare the effects of Supreme Court precedent on the two different 
sets of lower courts, we use data collected by Benesh for the circuits and data 
collected by Benesh and Martinek for the state supreme courts.
39
  To define 
the universe of cases for both the circuit courts and the state supreme courts, 
both sources used West’s Key Number System and the Decennial Digest, 
considering cases under keys 516 through 538 and decided between 1970 and 
1981.  These keys are under the larger subject of ―Criminal Law,‖ under the 
heading ―Evidence,‖ and the subheading ―Confessions.‖ Given West’s 
reputation, this listing should be considered exhaustive, as well as validly and 
reliably constructed.  Any omitted cases are assumed to have no systematic 
fact patterns.
40
  Because of the large number of cases produced at the state 
 
38. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 560 (1989).  The authors coded newspaper editorials in 
both liberally slanted and conservatively slanted outlets for mentions of a given Supreme Court 
nominee’s ideological predisposition.  Id. at 559.  Their measure is the percentage of paragraphs in 
which the nominee is discussed that suggest he or she is liberal.  Id.  This is the standard measure 
employed by political scientists studying the Supreme Court, and numerous studies have 
demonstrated that this measure has a strong relationship with the voting behavior of the justices.  See, 
e.g., Richard C. Kearney & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision-Making: The Impact of 
Court Composition on State and Local Government Litigation, 54 J. POL. 1008 (1992); William 
Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The 
Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 90 (1993); 
Reginald S. Sheehan et al., Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the 
Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 464, 465 (1992).  See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 136 (2002), for a discussion of another common measure of the 
ideology of Supreme Court justices (albeit one with issues of endogeneity). 
39. BENESH, supra note 1, considered the universe of confession cases from 1949 to 1981. 
Benesh & Martinek, supra note 8, at 110, considered a sample of confession cases from 1970 to 
1991.  We use the overlapping years, 1970–1981, in this analysis. 
40. This is important for the purposes of inference because, assuming that omitted cases are 
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court level using this procedure, the state cases are a sample, stratified by 
state.  All cases were coded trichotomously as follows: whether the fact is (1) 
mentioned as present; (2) mentioned as not present; or (3) not mentioned at 
all.  This allows for an investigation of whether the mention that a factor is not 
present balances the fact that another is present.  In turn, this allows us to 
measure the effect of precedent as the difference between the number of 
factors leading to a constitutional infirmity versus the number negating any 
such constitutional infirmity.  We compare the results of a logit estimation of 
a model of circuit court decision making to results of a model estimating state 
supreme court decision making to ascertain whether one lower court is more 
sensitive to Supreme Court precedent.
41
  Due to the variations in the 
institutional situations of the various state supreme courts and previous 
findings demonstrating the importance of several contextual and institutional 
factors on decision making, we also take into account additional contextual 
considerations, as detailed in the next section. 
V.  COMPARABILITY OF THE CASES 
Before turning to the additional variables considered in modeling state 
supreme court decision making, we note that, given the multiple principals 
and audiences discussed above, an argument might be made that decisions 
rendered at the Supreme Court level and those made at the circuit or state 
supreme court level cannot be fairly compared.  After all, the Supreme Court 
has total docket control, the circuits have basically none, and state courts of 
last resort vary on this dimension.  However, we find, in looking at the 
number of factors considered in each case, that the cases look a lot alike.  As 
seen in Tables 1–3, all three levels of courts consider cases with more than 
five factors at issue, and all three consider cases with warnings, coercion, and 
procedural issues more often than cases with other facts mentioned as 
relevant.  This gives us a stronger basis on which to consider the differential 
effects of the various facts on decision making in both courts.  In short, each 
court appears to be dealing with confession cases that are, if not identical, at 
least comparable. 
VI.  PUTTING STATE SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 
As noted previously, any rigorous analysis requires that we consider the 
complex situation in which judges on the state courts operate.  The judges on 
state high courts certainly must deal with and apply Supreme Court precedent.  
 
random with regard to the fact patterns they contain, there will be no effect on the parameter 
estimates obtained in the statistical analysis. 
41. See JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LOGIT, AND PROBIT 
MODELS 48, 65–66 (1984), for an accessible treatment of logit as a statistical estimator. 
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However, they also make decisions in a context that suggests further 
influences on their decisions.  While most scholars agree that attitudes play 
some role in the decision making of courts,
42
 law and courts scholars also 
recognize that ―any attempt to explain behavior with reference to beliefs but 
not to contexts such as institutional settings will inevitably be incomplete,‖ 
because contextual factors make enacting policy preferences either more or 
less difficult, and may even create certain goals and preferences related to the 
institution itself.
43
  This role for context ―means that the justices’ behavior 
might be motivated not only by a calculation about prevailing opportunities 
and risks but also by a sense of duty or obligation about their responsibilities 
to the law and the Constitution and by commitment to act as judges rather 
than as legislators or executives.‖44  These notions, put forward by ―new 
institutionalists‖45 in political science, seem especially applicable to the 
situation in which the judges of the state courts of last resort find themselves. 
Members of state supreme court benches, no less than U.S. Supreme 
Court justices, have their own ideological and policy preferences, and would 
likely wish to advance them in their decision making, given the appropriate 
 
42. The influence of judges’ attitudes on their decision making has been carefully documented.  
The seminal work with regard to the influence of attitudes on decision making by the U.S. Supreme 
Court is C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND 
VALUES 1937–1947 (1948).  The voluminous subsequent work taking up this theme includes PAUL 
M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION-
MAKING (2008); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).  Evidence as to the utility of judicial attitudes for 
understanding the choices judges of other courts make is also ubiquitous. For representative 
examples, see VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON 
FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION-MAKING (2006); Micheal W. Giles et al., Research Note, Picking 
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001); 
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961–1964, 60 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 374 (1966); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 
69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975).  But see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of 
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking , 58 
DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009).  Debate continues unabated about the relative influence of attitudinal 
considerations vis-à-vis legal considerations. 
43. Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional 
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 3–4 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).  
44. Id. at 5. 
45. The term ―new‖ included in the new institutionalist moniker is intended to distinguish these 
institutional scholars from previous institutional scholars who focused solely on the analysis of 
formal institutional structures and rules.  See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New 
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 734 (1984).  
The new institutionalism emerged in response to the ascendancy of the behavioral revolution and its 
exclusive focus on individuals and their behavior without regard for the context within which 
individuals behave.  See Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for 
a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763 (1961). 
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opportunity.  In addition, each state supreme court functions within its own 
unique environment in terms of the politics of its coordinate branches and the 
state in general.  Further, there are institutional differences among state courts 
of last resort that are likely to affect the salience of these various influences.  
The literature is replete with examples of scholarship demonstrating the 
importance of understanding context to understand judicial behavior in state 
courts.
46
  Little of it, however, explicitly tests the importance of context to 
determine the faithfulness of lower courts to superior courts.
47
  Here we 
consider how the system by which judges are retained in office, the political 
environment, the legal institutional design, and the policy preferences of the 
judges on the state courts of last resort compete with Supreme Court 
precedent to explain the decision making of state supreme courts in 
confession cases. 
A.  Judicial Retention and Political Environment 
State supreme court jurists ascend to their positions through a variety of 
appointive and elective mechanisms.
48
  Regardless of the mechanism, 
dominant political values in the state come into play.  Scholars have 
unequivocally demonstrated that elected judges display a definite sensitivity 
to their constituencies’ preferences.49  Judges who must face the electorate to 
remain in office have every incentive to avoid making decisions that can 
provide fodder for electoral opponents.  There has been a special focus in the 
extant literature on death penalty decisions,
50
 but there is no reason to suspect 
 
46. See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the 
American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 7, 12 (1995); Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, The 
California Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. POL. Q. 41, 43, 58 (1994); Gregory N. 
Flemming et al., An Integrated Model of Privacy Decision-Making in State Supreme Courts, 26 AM. 
POL. Q. 35, 40–41 (1998). 
47. A notable exception is Comparato & McClurg, supra note 25, at 727–29. 
48. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 40 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 277–78 (2008).  To illustrate, 
judges (including incumbents) on the Alabama Supreme Court are selected in non-partisan elections 
every six years, while judges (including incumbents) on the Oregon Supreme Court are selected by 
the court every six years.  Id.  South Carolina, in contrast, relies on legislative appointment (and 
reappointment) for the selection of its high court judges, while members of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court are appointed by the governor from the Judicial Nominating Commission for life 
terms.  Id.  Complete information as to the method of judicial selection and retention in the states is 
available from THE BOOK OF THE STATES.  In addition, the American Judicature Society maintains 
an easy-to-use online tool to locate judicial selection and retention information.  Am. Judicature 
Soc’y, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2010). 
49. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme 
Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 428 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Justices’ Responses to Case 
Facts: An Interactive Model, 24 AM. POL. Q. 237, 242 (1996). 
50. See, e.g., Carol Ann Traut & Craig F. Emmert, Expanding the Integrated Model of Judicial 
Decision-Making: The California Justices and Capital Punishment, 60 J. POL. 1166, 1166–67 
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that the lessons learned will not travel to other areas of criminal jurisprudence.  
For example, search-and-seizure decision making has been found to be 
influenced by such considerations,
51
 and we contend that confession cases are 
likely to be influenced as well. 
We expect that state supreme court judges retained via elections should be 
more likely to uphold a challenged confession as the electorate becomes more 
conservative, ceteris paribus.  The logic is simple: such judges are likely to 
wish to avoid being seen as soft on crime.  To measure electorate preferences, 
we utilize Berry et al.’s measure of citizenry ideology, which relies upon 
interest group ratings and ranges from zero (most conservative) to one (most 
liberal).
52
  Similarly, if state high court judges are strategic (which the extant 
evidence suggests they are),
53
 there is reason to believe that when appointed 
judges act, they are likely to keep in mind the preferences of the political 
elites responsible for their accession to—and retention on—the bench.  
Indeed, in a recent analysis, Langer found that members of state supreme 
court benches do show concern for retaliation by other state political actors 
(the legislature and governor), as manifested by a lessened propensity to 
engage in judicial review, for at least some areas of law.
54
  We similarly argue 
that justices will take ideology into account when deciding confession cases, 
basing their decisions to suppress confessions, in part, on the ideology of 
those responsible for their retention.
55
  For judges who are retained by one of 
the branches of government or who serve life terms after being appointed by 
one or some combination of both of the other governmental branches, we 
expect that the referent for judges considering their environment will be the 
prevailing ideology in the coordinate branches.  Berry et al. have a measure 
comparable to their citizen ideology measure that considers the ideology of 
 
(1998). 
51. Martinek, supra note 6, at 40–42. 
52. In constructing their measure of citizen ideology for each state for each year from 1960 to 
1993, William Berry and his colleagues began with interest group ratings for each member of 
Congress.  See William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American 
States, 1960–93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998).  Using those interest group ratings to locate 
congressmen in ideological space, they proceeded to estimate citizen ideology in each congressional 
district as a function of the ideology score for the incumbent congressman in the district, the 
estimated ideology score for a challenger (or hypothetical challenger to the incumbent), and the 
election results (to take into account the ideological divisions in the electorate).  Id. at 330–31.  To 
determine state-level citizen ideology, they then aggregated the district-level scores, weighting them 
on the basis of each candidate’s share of support in his or her respective district.  Id.  
53. See, e.g., LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 123 (2002). 
54. Id. at 125. 
55. We determined method of retention by consulting relevant editions of THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES, supra note 48, supplemented as necessary with information obtained from state ―blue 
books,‖ state government web sites, and the American Judicature Society. 
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state elites, and we use it to approximate state ideology when judges owe their 
office, tenure, or both, to those in positions of power in the state 
government.
56
 
B.  Legal Environment 
The new institutionalists have also provided persuasive evidence in 
support of the thesis that institutional arrangements matter for judicial outputs.  
For example, some state supreme courts are relieved of the burden of a 
nondiscretionary docket, or at least have that burden ameliorated; others, 
however, must hear every case that comes to them, which lessens their ability 
to effectuate policy.  We presume that the existence of an intermediate 
appellate court and a discretionary (rather than mandatory) criminal 
jurisdiction are indicators of at least some freedom from frivolous cases.  
When state supreme courts are able to rely upon intermediate appellate courts 
to resolve easy cases, they can restrict themselves to more important ones, 
providing them with the opportunity to decide more cases in which there may 
be a constitutionally defective confession.  Having an intermediate appellate 
court also reduces the workload for the state supreme court, giving the 
members of that court additional room to make policy and take big cases.
57
 
So, too, discretion with regard to criminal appeals (i.e., a discretionary docket) 
allows judges to focus on policy content in selecting the cases they will hear.
58
  
Therefore, we expect that, ceteris paribus, state supreme courts with an 
intermediate appellate court and those with discretionary criminal 
jurisdictions will be more likely to overturn challenged confessions.  Each of 
these conditions are coded dichotomously, i.e., the state either has it (1) or 
does not (0). 
Also likely to be relevant is a state’s constitution.  As one state supreme 
court jurist remarked, ―[S]tate charters offer important local protection against 
the ebbs and flows of federal constitutional interpretation.‖59  In most 
instances states have adopted, more or less word for word, the language of the 
U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights in guaranteeing protection against self-
 
56. Berry et al., supra note 52, at 332.  The Berry et al. measure of government (or elite) 
ideology for each state is based on the ideology scores for the governor and the major party 
delegations in each chamber of the state legislature, combined on the basis of specified assumptions 
regarding the relative power of the governor, the minority party in each legislative chamber, and the 
majority party in each legislative chamber.  Id. 
57. As with information about methods of selection and retention, information about the 
presence or absence of an intermediate appellate court is available in the various editions of THE 
BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 48, at 286–88. 
58. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING 
CASE PROCESSING, at v–vi (1990), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ 
KIS_DiffCMIntAppCts.pdf. 
59. People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174 (Cal. 1986). 
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incrimination (the protection relevant to confession cases).  There are, 
however, a few instances in which the language of a state constitution is more 
protective of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution and others where it is 
less so.
60
  Presumably, the language of the state constitution should affect the 
decisions a state supreme court jurist can make.  When the state constitution 
provides more expansive protections than those afforded by the federal 
Constitution, it enhances the likelihood that a confession will be invalidated as 
involuntary.  Conversely, when the state constitution provides less expansive 
protections than those afforded by the federal Constitution, the likelihood of 
invalidating a confession as involuntary is likely to be diminished.  This 
variable is coded 0 for a state constitution with no self-incrimination 
provision, 1 for one less protective than the federal Constitution, 2 for one 
identical to those found in the U.S. Constitution, and 3 for state constitutions 
that are more protective of self-incrimination.
61
  We expect this variable to be 
positively related to the exclusion of a challenged confession. 
State courts also have the liberty to rely upon independent state grounds in 
writing their opinions.  We expect that state courts may plausibly avoid the 
thrust of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine by resting their decisions on 
independent state grounds, as Michigan v. Long made clear they could do.
62
  
Accordingly, we code each case as to whether (1) or not (0) the decision rests 
on independent state grounds.
63
  We expect this variable to really matter only 
in tandem with the variable measuring the protections afforded to the accused 
by the state constitution.
64
  Accordingly, we also include a variable that 
measures the interaction: Those state courts operating under more protective 
state constitutions are expected to be more likely to exclude a confession 
when reliance is placed on state rather than federal grounds than those with 
less protective state constitutions. 
Considered collectively, these variations in external environment, 
institutional features, and legal context allow us to compare the state courts 
with the circuit courts in terms of their faithfulness to Supreme Court 
precedent, while remaining sensitive to the decision making influences unique 
 
60. For a detailed and informative discussion of constitutional development in the fifty states, 
including their convergence with and divergence from the federal Constitution, see generally 
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998). 
61. We obtained information as to the relevant state constitutional provisions by consulting the 
various state government web sites. 
62. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). 
63. We relied on the language of the state high court opinions themselves to code this variable.  
64. In other words, we have no reason to believe that whether a decision rests on independent 
state grounds will make a state court more or less likely to admit a challenged confession into 
evidence.  However, when the state constitution specifically affords greater protection and the state 
court decision rests on independent state grounds, the court should be less likely to admit the 
challenged confession (i.e., more likely to exclude the challenged confession). 
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to the state context. 
VII.  MODELS OF DECISION MAKING 
We seek to test similar models of decision making on a set of cases 
decided by the state courts of last resort with one decided by the circuit courts 
to ascertain, within a given area of criminal appeals, whether one level of 
court is more cognizant of, or compliant with, Supreme Court precedent on 
point.  Hence, we include the aforementioned measures of Supreme Court 
precedent in each model (three measuring confession precedent, one 
measuring the ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court, and one taking into 
account the cases decided during the period that relaxed Miranda’s 
requirements).  In addition, we control for murder/manslaughter, expecting 
that judges will be less willing to overturn cases involving the most serious of 
crimes for reasons relating to how a confession of guilt was obtained.  We 
also control for the lower court decision, because, at least at the circuit level, 
appellate courts are often deferential to the lower trial courts.  And, of course, 
no model of judicial decision making is complete without attention to 
preferences.  Currently, the best available measures of state supreme court 
judge ideology are the PAJID scores, developed by Hall and Brace.
65
  For the 
circuit courts, we employ a blunter measure, that of the percentage of any 
given panel appointed by a Democratic president.
66
 
 
65. Brace and his collaborators develop an individual-level measure of judicial ideology with 
the aid of the Berry et al. citizen and government ideology measures discussed before.  See supra 
notes 52, 56.  Specifically, for appointed judges, Brace et al. use the government ideology score at 
the time of a judge’s appointment as that judge’s ideology score, weighted by the party affiliation of 
the judge.  Paul Brace et al., Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 
387, 396–97 (2000).  For elected judges, Brace et al. use the citizen ideology score at the time of a 
judge’s election as that judge’s ideology score, weighted by the party affiliation of the judge.  Id.  
66. Blunt though this measure may be, it reflects the fact that the President nominates court of 
appeals judges.  Though the Senate has the constitutionally granted prerogative to confirm or reject a 
presidential nominee, the Senate may not substitute its own nominee for that of a President.  In other 
words, when an individual nominated by the President is not confirmed by the Senate, it is the 
President who retains the authority to make a subsequent nomination.  The evidence with regard to 
the utility of the party of the appointing President as a measure of judicial attitudes is extensive.  See, 
e.g., Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial 
Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 963, 970 (1992); Donald 
R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 1955–1986, 43 W. POL. Q. 317, 319 (1990).  See generally Daniel R. Pinello, 
Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 242 
(1999).  For a thorough consideration of the debate over appropriate statistical measures and an 
explicit evaluation of the party of the appointing President, see Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, 
Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
743, 782–83 (2005). 
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VIII.  ANALYSIS 
Tables 4 and 5 present our findings.  The former (Table 4) shows the same 
model estimated on the basis of state supreme court data and on the basis of 
circuit court data; the latter (Table 5) takes into account the contextual 
features of decision making by the state supreme courts.  As seen in Table 4, 
Supreme Court precedent heavily influences both courts in this area. 
Measures of precedent in all three categories are signed as predicted, and 
highly statistically significant.  However, neither court seems particularly 
concerned with the Supreme Court’s ideology at the time they are making 
their decision, nor are they overly attentive to the changes made in Supreme 
Court doctrine over the time period examined.  The latter is most likely due to 
the short time frame—neither court really had much of an opportunity to 
apply the new exceptions, and all three exceptions were somewhat limited in 
their nature. 
The lack of a significant relationship between the decisions made and the 
ideological makeup of the Supreme Court suggests that the lower courts seek 
only to apply Supreme Court precedent as they understand it and not to 
anticipate the future behavior of the High Court or attempt to avoid its 
review.
67
  Interestingly, the only other variable significant to the circuit courts 
is the decision of the district courts, while the only other significant influence 
on state supreme court decision making is their own ideology.  This difference 
could be due to the difference in docket control enjoyed by the two courts, 
through which the circuits are hearing a greater number of easy cases.  
Alternatively, this difference could be due to their concomitant difference in 
terms of hierarchical level (the state supreme court being the highest in each 
system and the circuits being but an intermediate court) or some real 
difference between the two in the way that decisions are made.  This analysis 
cannot distinguish among these options. 
This difference, however, largely disappears once we place the state 
supreme courts into their proper context, as reported in Table 5.  There, we 
continue to see a tremendous influence by the Supreme Court’s precedents on 
the lower courts’ decisions, with all three direct measures of precedent again 
both signed as expected and highly statistically significant.  The state supreme 
courts, however, do react to their environments, as courts are attentive to the 
ideology of the actor responsible for obtaining or retaining their seats (though 
the variable just misses conventional levels of significance).  Further, state 
supreme courts are less likely to exclude a confession from evidence in a 
murder case, though this finding obtains a lower significance level than 
generally considered to be definitive (p < 0.08).  Also at that lower, but still 
 
67. Notably, this comports with interviews one author has conducted with circuit court judges. 
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substantial, level of statistical significance is the variable measuring whether 
the state enjoys discretionary jurisdiction over criminal appeals.  As can be 
seen in Table 5, states with greater discretion over their dockets are more 
likely to exclude a given confession than states that lack such docket control.  
Importantly, this attention to state ideology and the influence of jurisdiction 
comes at the expense of the effectuation of their own policy preferences; the 
mean PAJID score for the majority in any given case is no longer relevant to 
the outcome of the case. 
In short, we find the Supreme Court’s precedents to matter to both state 
high courts and the federal courts of appeals.  To which set of courts is it more 
important?  Table 6 considers the influence of the Court’s precedent on the 
state courts of last resort and on the circuit courts, respectively, as measured 
by the change in the probability that a confession will be excluded for various 
levels of the independent variables measuring the effects of the factual 
considerations deemed relevant by the Supreme Court.  As shown in Table 6, 
while Supreme Court precedent in all three categories does exert influence on 
both courts, the circuit courts seem to be more consistently and strongly 
attentive to the Court’s decisions in these cases.  While the state courts are 
largely influenced by the balance of factors concerning coercion, they are less 
sympathetic to characteristics of the accused than the circuit courts.  Further, 
the state courts are less likely to exclude a confession based upon procedural 
defects than the circuits.  It is interesting to consider the state courts’ context 
when thinking about these results.  One could surely make the case that 
excluding a confession extracted via some type of coercion is less likely to 
garner public disapproval than excluding a confession because of procedural 
considerations, or because an accused was somehow more susceptible to 
police influence.  Interestingly, the state courts change more drastically with 
changes in the coercion variable than they do in response to changes in either 
of the other two precedent categories.  The circuits, on the other hand, behave 
differently.  They are far more influenced by susceptible defendants than the 
states; indeed, the influence of this variable is nearly as strong as the variable 
measuring the degree to which the accused was coerced. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
As is the nature of a common-law system, courts in the United States 
subscribe to a view of decision making that includes a large role for the 
decisions made by past courts and for decisions made by courts higher in the 
judicial hierarchy.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court is the self-declared final 
arbiter of the Constitution.  It is uncontroversial to suggest, then, that lower 
courts ought to be influenced by the decision of courts ―higher‖ than they.  
However, that notion does not resolve the issue of Supreme Court impact for 
at least two reasons.  First, judicial decisions are made by people, not 
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machines.  That is, judges are individuals whose cognitive processes are not 
without vulnerabilities, and those vulnerabilities can lead even judges who are 
the most earnest in their commitment to faithful compliance with the Court to 
render decisions that are not perfectly compliant.
68
  Second, the Supreme 
Court expects compliance by all lower courts, including state courts of last 
resort, when they decide questions of federal law.  After all, the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause unequivocally asserts that the U.S. Constitution is superior 
to any other law, and the Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States 
makes clear that its confession jurisprudence is its interpretation of rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution.
69
  Despite this expectation, however, the 
Court is faced with the task of inducing compliance on the part of a 
heterogeneous group of courts, and a one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to 
be useful. 
In this Article, we have demonstrated that there are notable differences in 
the decision making context that lead to differential force of the Supreme 
Court’s proclamations in the area of confessions.  To be clear, both the federal 
courts of appeals and state supreme courts are compliant: The variables 
directly measuring Supreme Court precedent are highly significant and 
correctly signed in the models of decision making for both sets of courts.  But 
state courts are evidently slightly less compelled than the circuit courts to 
make certain decisions as a consequence of the factual configuration of the 
case under consideration.  This finding is interesting from the perspective of 
empirical theory building.  Our objective here was not to engage in strictly 
theoretical testing, but rather to uncover systematic differences in compliance 
on the part of these two different categories of courts.  Our models were 
obviously informed by the extant scholarship and, in that sense, were 
theoretically motivated.  But our findings with regard to compliance on the 
part of state and federal lower courts are perhaps most important from the 
perspective of normative theory.  The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Constitution to forbid the use of confessions that are compelled by coercion 
and not preceded by procedural protections in a criminal prosecution.  Yet, 
while it is likely that the lower courts (both federal and state) will so decide, it 
is more likely that the circuits will do so than that the states will do so.  
Hence, due process protections (of which protection against coerced 
confessions is one) are not uniformly enforced across the judicial system. 
 
68. Commenting more generally about judges’ cognition, Guthrie et al. observe, ―[W]holly 
apart from political orientation and self-interest, the very nature of human thought can induce judges 
to make consistent and predictable mistakes in particular situations.‖  Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001).  For a recent consideration of the psychology 
of judging, see THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell 
eds., 2010). 
69. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
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In short, the Constitution does not mean the same thing for all accused of 
crime but, rather, varies depending upon the venue.  Surely, this is neither an 
intended nor a desirable feature of the federal nature of American 
government.  It suggests that the Supreme Court should do more to reign in its 
judicial inferiors, whether conceived of as members of a judicial team or as 
judicial agents.  Taking more than a handful of cases from the state courts, 
thereby providing more guidance to the lower courts and ensuring greater 
uniformity, would be a good first step. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1
70
 
U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Mentions Per Fact, 1949–198171 
 
Fact Number of Cases 
Mentioned72 
Percentage of Cases 
Silence Warning 32 56 
Attorney Warning 32 56 
Psychological Coercion 28 49 
Miranda Warnings 27 47 
Length of Interrogation 25 44 
Incommunicado Detention 23 40 
Magistrate Hearing 19 33 
Intelligence 17 30 
Procedural Fairness 17 30 
 
70. Benesh & Martinek, supra note 8, at 117. 
71. Because the Supreme Court decided only ten confession cases in the time span we consider 
here, we offer this generalized portrait of the Court’s decision making in this area of law. 
72. Cases in which the Supreme Court either mentioned the fact as present or not present.  
Presumably, each mention should influence the lower courts to at least consider the fact. 
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Request for Attorney Denied 17 30 
Had No Attorney 16 28 
Deprived of Basic Needs 16 28 
Police Relays 15 26 
Physical Coercion 14 25 
Minority Race 14 25 
Mental Illness/Deficiency 11 19 
Experience with Law 11 19 
Length of Detention 10 17 
Mitigating Circumstances 10 18 
Youth 9 16 
Other Characteristics 9 16 
Fruit of Illegality 7 12 
Prior Coerced Confession 6 11 
Place of Detention 5 9 
Waiver of Miranda Rights 4 7 
Volunteered Information 4 7 
Harmless Error 4 7 
Co-Defendant Confession 3 5 
Place of Interrogation 3 5 
Total Mentions: 408 Facts Per Case: 7 
Table 2
73
 
State Supreme Court Comparison Mentions Per Fact, 1970–1981 
 
Fact Number of Cases 
Mentioned74 
Percentage of Cases 
Miranda Warnings 378 84 
Attorney Warning 243 54 
Silence Warning 233 52 
Psychological Coercion 223 49 
Waiver of Miranda Rights 192 43 
Procedural Fairness 141 31 
Had No Attorney 108 24 
Request for Attorney Denied 96 22 
Physical Coercion 94 21 
Youth 74 16 
Fruit of Illegality 66 15 
 
73. Benesh & Martinek, supra note 8, at 120. 
74. Cases in which the state supreme court either mentioned the fact as present or not present.  
Presumably, each mention should influence the lower courts to at least consider the fact.  
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Magistrate Hearing 60 13 
Mitigating Circumstances 59 13 
Mental Illness/Deficiency 48 11 
Deprived of Basic Needs 45 10 
Length of Interrogation 43 10 
Volunteered Information 41 9 
Intelligence 41 9 
Other Characteristics 38 9 
Incommunicado Detention 34 8 
Experience with Law 21 5 
Co-Defendant Confession 19 4 
Place of Detention 15 3 
Length of Detention 15 3 
Harmless Error 10 2 
Prior Coerced Confession 7 2 
Minority Race 4 1 
Police Relays 3 1 
Place of Interrogation 3 1 
Total Mentions: 2,354 Facts Per Case: 5 
 
Table 3
75
 
U.S. Court of Appeals Comparison Mentions Per Fact, 1970–1981 
 
Fact Number of Cases 
Mentioned76 
Percentage of Cases 
Silence Warning 274 86 
Attorney Warning 271 85 
Miranda Warnings 247 78 
Waiver of Miranda Rights 145 45 
Psychological Coercion 127 40 
Procedural Fairness 122 38 
Mitigating Circumstances 85 27 
Magistrate Hearing 83 26 
Physical Coercion 66 21 
Other Characteristics 62 20 
Request for Attorney Denied 61 19 
Fruit of Illegality 57 18 
 
75. BENESH, supra note 1. 
76. Cases in which the circuit court either mentioned the fact as present or not present.  
Presumably, each mention should influence the lower courts to at least consider the fact. 
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Length of Interrogation 44 14 
Intelligence 40 13 
Had No Attorney 39 12 
Incommunicado Detention 32 10 
Volunteered Information 30 10 
Deprived of Basic Needs 30 9 
Youth 30 9 
Mental Illness/Deficiency 25 8 
Experience with Law 23 7 
Harmless Error 21 7 
Minority Race 15 5 
Length of Detention 11 4 
Prior Coerced Confession 11 3 
Police Relays 11 3 
Co-Defendant Confession 9 3 
Place of Interrogation 6 2 
Place of Detention 4 1 
Total Mentions: 1,981 Facts Per Case: 6 
 
 
Table 4 
Circuits and States and Supreme Court Precedent 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals 
 
Variables Coefficients Significance Levels 
(two-tailed) 
 
Supreme Court Precedent 
Coercion 1.3299 0.001 
Characteristics of the 
Accused 
1.5084 0.000 
Procedural Issues 0.5180 0.000 
Precedent Change 0.0821 0.813 
Ideology 
U.S. Supreme Court Mean 
Segal/Cover 
-4.5046 0.097 
Percent Democrat on Panel  0.7770 0.350 
Controls 
Lower Court Excluded 2.2655 0.000 
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Confession 
Case Involved Murder or 
Manslaughter 
-0.6621 0.337 
 
Constant -1.9295 0.049 
Pseudo R2 = 0.5835; Percent Correctly Classified = 91.59%; Reduction in Error = 49% 
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State Courts of Last Resort 
 
Variables Coefficients Significance Levels 
(two-tailed) 
 
Supreme Court Precedent 
Coercion 1.5687 0.000 
Characteristics of the 
Accused 
0.6825 0.000 
Procedural Issues  0.2655 0.000 
Precedent Change 0.0142 0.964 
Ideology 
U.S. Supreme Court Mean 
Segal/Cover 
-0.8384 0.691 
Mean PAJID Score of 
Majority  
0.0279 0.007 
Controls 
Lower Court Excluded 
Confession 
0.1330 0.854 
Case Involved Murder or 
Manslaughter 
-0.4001 0.185 
 
Constant -1.3703 0.098 
 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3431; Percent Correctly Classified = 86.28%; Reduction in Error = 31% 
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Table 5 
Putting State Court Decision Making in Context 
(Robust Standard Errors) 
 
Variables Coefficients Significance Levels 
(two-tailed) 
 
Supreme Court Precedent 
Coercion 1.6543 0.000 
Characteristics of the 
Accused 
0.6230 0.002 
Procedural Issues  0.2505 0.001 
Precedent Change 0.1065 0.735 
Ideology 
U.S. Supreme Court Mean 
Segal/Cover 
-0.5721 0.783 
Mean PAJID of Majority  0.0138 0.266 
Context 
Grounds for Decision 0.1894 0.370 
Constitution Protective -0.0403 0.840 
Constitutional Grounds 0.1429 0.640 
Jurisdiction 0.4628 0.077 
Intermediate Appellate 
Court 
0.1867 0.592 
State Ideology 0.0200 0.061 
Controls 
Lower Court Excluded 
Confession 
0.3080 0.693 
Case Involved Murder or 
Manslaughter 
-0.5266 0.085 
 
Constant -2.6643 0.008 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3620; Percent Correctly Classified = 86.89%; Reduction in Error = 34% 
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Table 6 
The Influence of Supreme Court Precedent 
 
 
Probability Y = 1 
Confession Excluded 
(Confidence Interval) 
Change from Mean 
U.S. Courts of Appeals 
All variables at mean 
0.044 
(0.017, 0.092) 
 
Three more coercive than 
noncoercive facts 
0.783 
(0.334, 0.978) 
+ 0.739 
Three fewer coercive than 
noncoercive facts 
0.004 
(0.000, 0.026) 
- 0.040 
Three more sympathetic 
accused characteristics 
0.756 
(0.403, 0.952) 
+ 0.712 
Three fewer sympathetic 
accused characteristics 
0.001 
(0.000, 0.005) 
- 0.043 
Three more procedural 
problems than procedural 
protections 
0.393 
(0.199, 0.613) 
+ 0.349 
Three fewer procedural 
problems than procedural 
protections 
0.031 
(0.010, 0.069) 
- 0.013 
State Supreme Courts 
All variables at mean 
0.087 
(0.057, 0.124) 
 
Three more coercive than 
noncoercive facts 
0.962 
(0.894, 0.992) 
+ 0.875 
Three fewer coercive than 
noncoercive facts 
0.003 
(0.001, 0.010) 
- 0.084 
Three more sympathetic 
accused characteristics 
0.419 
(0.182, 0.693) 
+ 0.332 
Three fewer sympathetic 
accused characteristics 
0.014 
(0.003, 0.041) 
- 0.079 
Three more procedural 
problems than procedural 
protections 
0.300 
(0.156, 0.494) 
+ 0.213 
Three fewer procedural 
problems than procedural 
protections 
0.077 
(0.049, 0.112) 
- 0.010 
 
